STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

David B. Allyn, Complainant vs. James C. Delaney, Respondent

Grievance Complaint #99-0861

.DECISION

Pursuant to Practice Book §2-35, the undersigned, duly-appointed reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee, conducted a hearing at the Superior Court, 1061 Main Street, Bridgeport, Connecticut on January 3, 2001. The hearing addressed the record of the complaint filed on April 10, 2000, and the probable cause determination rendered by a reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee on October 20, 2000, finding that there existed probable cause that the Respondent violated Rules 1.3 and 1.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The reviewing committee’s probable cause determination was contrary to the determination of no probable cause filed by the New Haven Judicial District, Geographical Area 6 Grievance Panel on August 23, 2000.

Notice of the hearing was mailed to the Complainant and to the Respondent on November 21, 2000. The Complainant and the Respondent both appeared and gave testimony.

Reviewing committee member Mr. Michael Goodman was not available for the January 3, 2001 hearing on this matter. Both the Complainant and the Respondent waived the participation of Mr. Goodman in the decision of this case. Accordingly, this matter was heard and decided by reviewing committee members Attorney Salvatore DePiano and Attorney Noble Allen.

This reviewing committee finds the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:

In September of 1999, the Complainant hired Attorney Lynn Williams to represent him in a family court matter regarding child support payments and paternity. In February of 2000, Attorney Williams, who was in the military reserves at the time, was activated and sent to the Kosovo province of Serbia. Because there was a court date scheduled for later in the month of February, Attorney Williams transferred the file and the retainer paid by the Complainant to the Respondent to represent the Complainant. A few days after the transfer of the file to the Respondent, the Complainant spoke with the Respondent who informed him that the February court date was cancelled. The Respondent wanted additional time to research the paternity issue and to prepare for the hearing. The hearing date was continued to March 8, 2000. The matter did not go forward on March 8, 2000 due to the Respondent’s unavailability. Thereafter, the Complainant had great difficulty communicating with the Respondent despite repeatedly telephoning him to find out about a future court date for his matter. The Complainant ultimately worked out an agreement regarding child support on his own. The Respondent provided no communications in writing to the Complainant outlining research performed on the paternity issue or the scheduling of future court hearings. The Complainant’s work hours were to be reduced as of May, 2000, making his ongoing child support obligations a financial hardship.

This reviewing committee also considered the following:

The Respondent admitted that he did not return all of the Complainant’s phone calls but believed he attempted to contact him by telephone after the cancellation of the March, 2000 hearing. The Respondent also testified that he performed substantial research on the issue of paternity. The Complainant and Respondent met for the first time on the day of the grievance hearing.

This reviewing committee concludes by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Although it was understandable that the February hearing was postponed due to the Respondent’s relatively late retention to represent the Complainant, we are concerned that the important issues of paternity and child support were never advanced in court by the Respondent on behalf of the Complainant after the cancellation of the February hearing. The Respondent’s only excuse for canceling the March hearing was that he was otherwise occupied but no further explanation was given. Additionally, no further hearing date was scheduled for the Complainant which we find unacceptable, especially in light of the fact that the Complainant’s financial situation became more difficult. We conclude that this conduct violated Rule 1.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Additionally, we find unacceptable the level of communication between the Complainant and the Respondent. We believe that if the Respondent was unable to reach the Complainant by telephone, he should have written to the Complainant outlining the steps to be taken to advance the issues further for which he was retained. We conclude that the Complainant made frequent, if not constant, efforts to contact the Respondent, but received little, if any, communication after early March, 2000. We conclude that this conduct violated Rule 1.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Accordingly, it is the decision of this reviewing committee that the Respondent be reprimanded.

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Attorney Salvatore C. DePiano

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Attorney Noble F. Allen